Is God Impartial?
In the case of the Christian religion, man is subjected to damnation, either because he is ignorant of the system, or because his mind cannot discern the quantum of evidence necessary to establish its divine origin; but in the system of nature, although there is a real difference in regard to the possession of talents, yet the man weak in intellect cannot, in justice, be subjected to punishment on this account. No Christian will contend that great mental energy will entitle a man to salvation, or, on the other hand, that a feeble understanding will, in the mind of the Deity, be considered as a justifiable cause of damnation. No; if God be just, he will require only the due and proper exercise of those diversified talents which he had variously bestowed upon his creatures. If one be weak and another strong, one foolish and another discerning, the justice of God demands a mode of treatment exactly adjusted to these different powers and faculties. The Christian religion, therefore, in order to accord with the system of nature, should have annexed no penalty to unbelief, whether that belief resulted from total ignorance, or an honest dissent of mind, after a due examination of the evidence. The evidence of any system of religion ought to be equal to all, where equal credence is demanded of all. By what rules of moral justice does the Deity demand the unqualified belief of the present generation upon a less degree of evidence than he is said to have formerly exhibited? If miracles be necessary in one age to establish the truth of Christianity, they are equally necessary in every age. If one country be favoured with supernatural proofs, all other countries are equally entitled to the same unequivocal, convincing, and demonstrative testimony. If impartiality be considered as an attribute of God, this impartiality should at all times and in all places be preserved with an undeviating uniformity; but in every case where merit is attributed to the human assent, on the ground of supernatural proof, and in every other case where demerit is attached to unbelief, when the evidence in quantity and quality is of an inferior nature, this principle is notoriously abandoned.
--Elihu Palmer (1764-1806), Principles of Nature; or, A Development of
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