The Logical Atheist

Is something good because God says so or does God say so because it's good. Plato has Socrates take up this question in an early dialogue, Euthyphro ( trans. Benjamin Jowett ) : Euth.  Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious  and holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious. Soc.  Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro,  or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of  others? What do you say? Euth.  We should enquire; and I believe that the statement  will stand the test of enquiry. Soc.  We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while.  The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious  or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is  beloved of the gods. Euth.  I do not understand your meaning,  Socrates. Soc.  I will endeavour to explain: we, speak of carrying  and we speak of being carried, of ...

Many philosophers, including St Thomas, have held that the voice of individual conscience is   the voice of God speaking to the individual, whether he is a believer or not. This would resolve the alleged conflict [between obeying God and exercising  moral autonomy] because in following one's conscience one would at the same time be discharging his obligations as a worshiper to obey God. However, this manoeuvre is unsatisfying, since if taken seriously it would lead to the conclusion that, in speaking to us through our 'consciences', God is merely tricking us: for he is giving us the illusion of self-governance while all the time he is manipulating our thoughts from without. Moreover, in acting from conscience we are acting under the view that our actions are right and not merely that they are decreed by a higher power. Plato's argument in the  Euthyphro  can be adapted to this point: If in speaking to us through the voice of conscience, God is informing us of what is...

In this paper I shall present an a priori argument against the existence of God which is based on the conception of God as a fitting object of worship. The argument is that God cannot exist, because no being could ever be a fitting object of worship.... [T]he idea that any being could be worthy  of worship is much more problematical than we might have at first imagined. For in admitting that a being is worthy of worship we should be recognising him as having an unqualified claim on our obedience. The question, then, is whether there could be such an unqualified claim.... In fact, there is a long tradition in moral philosophy, from Plato to Kant, according to which such a recognition could never be made by a moral agent. According to this tradition, to be a moral agent is to be an autonomous or self-directed agent.... On this view, to deliver oneself over to a moral authority for directions about what to do is simply incompatible with being a moral agent.    --James Rachel...