The General Theory of Skeptical Relativity

I've heard at least one skeptical atheist say -- and I'm sure many others also believe it -- that one cannot be too much of a skeptic. But they don't really mean it. How do I know? I know because they regularly mock people who express skepticism about things they apparently believe in: evolution, vaccination, the roundness and old age of the earth, catastrophic climate change, the legitimacy of the state, and so on. (I'm doubtful of only the last two.) Why are some skeptics more equal than others?

"No," the skeptical atheists are likely to reply. "We good skeptics have sound reasons for our doubt, while the bad skeptics have none for theirs." But both kinds of skeptics think they have good reasons for their doubts. Evolution-skeptics are aware of what evolution-believers regard as evidence, but the former think it is bad and possibly even fabricated. I'm not saying they are right, only that they have their reasons too. We can resolve this disagreement only through examination of the evidence and good-faith argument. I simply find it distasteful for self-labeled skeptics to mock people who are skeptical about the "wrong" things. I thought skepticism can't be taken too far.

What this means is that skepticism is not the important thing. Evidentialism is. (Admittedly, skeptic sounds edgier and sexier than evidentialist.) All people -- including religious people -- think they have good reasons for believing or disbelieving. If they didn't, they wouldn't believe or disbelieve, as the case may be. And in each case, their opponents dispute the claim that the reasons are good. Atheists are left unconvinced by the alleged proofs, philosophical, scientific, and revelatory, for God. "The evidence fails; in other words, it's not evidence. My position stands," they say. Similarly, theists are unconvinced by the atheists' arguments against them. "The refutation fails; in other words, it is not a refutation. My position stands." 

Each side maintains its skepticism with respect to the other: the atheist remains skeptical of extranaturalist explanations, the theist of naturalist explanations. Why does one side have a better claim to the label skeptic than the other?

The test is not whether they are skeptics, but whether they are open to a fair consideration of the evidence and counterargument. Asking for and being open to evidence is not a sign of skepticism. An orthodox skeptic would have to be skeptical of all evidence on the belief that we just cannot know things. David Hume, strangely would not conclude that a billiard ball caused another one to move simply because it appeared to bump it. We think that, he said, only because we're used to seeing that sequence -- and that's all we can say. 

I can think of many empirical propositions -- the propositions of anti-vaxxers and flat/young earthers, for example -- for which prominent online skeptical atheists seem unwilling to consider the proffered evidence -- they prefer to take the word of medical and geological specialists without personally being able to confirm what the experts say -- that is, "on faith." (Many people use the word faith in just that way and not to mean "without reason.") In this way, they resemble the theists they regularly mock. This is okay, but the atheists should admit it. I, a nonskeptical logical atheist, don't mind admitting that I regularly take the word of reputable specialists "on faith," though of course I regard what they say as in principle defeasible: potentially open to refutation. Even reputable specialists can be wrong, but I respect the division of labor in the production of knowledge. Relying on reputable experts, I'm confident about many propositions that I would not know how to verify: for example, that water is two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen, that the sun is 93 million miles from the earth, that the earth is very old and pretty round, and that a high-fat/low-carb diet is good for you. 

In light of all this, I call my approach the General Theory of Skeptical Relativity. Skepticism exists relative to a frame of reference other than the particular skeptic’s own. Certain atheists can be said (colloquially) to be skeptical of the theists' supernaturalism and some theists can be said (colloquially) to be skeptical of the atheists' naturalism. What distinguishes people is the degree of their openness to disconfirmation of their beliefs. The more-skeptical-than-thou pose is unattractive.