An Ontology of Morals

Aristotle identifies the distinctively human capacity for reason and speech as the basis of our being naturally political animals, for it enables us to pursue our goals through discussion with one another. Moreover, Aristotle famously regards logos, reason or speech, as the essential trait around which a flourishing human life must be organized. This, it seems, is why Aristotle regards it as an essential component of a truly human life to deal with others politically, i.e., through reason and discourse–i.e., as conversation partners. But such an ideal creates a strong presumption  against the use of force, and in favor of relying on persuasion as far as possible.... To deal with others by force is to act in a subhuman manner, like a beast of prey; we live a more human life (and therefore, in Aristotelian terms, a better life) to the extent that our relations with other people embody reason and persuasion rather than coercion. Therefore, the need to avoid the bestial type of vice gives the virtuous  agent reason to accept an obligation to respect other people as ends in themselves, rather than to treat them as mere means to her own ends.

--Roderick T. Long, "The Irrelevance of Responsibility," 
Social Philosophy and Policy, Summer 1999 

16.2 (Summer 1999),