Purposiveness Without a Soul

When a person does something voluntarily, in the sense that he does it on purpose or is trying to to do it, his action certainly reflects some quality or qualities of mind, since (it is more than a verbal point to say) he is in some degree and in one fashion or another minding what he is doing. It follows also that, if linguistically equipped, he can then tell, without research or conjecture, what he has been trying to accomplish. But ... these implications of voluntariness do not carry with them the double-life corollaries often assumed. To frown intentionally is not to do one thing on one's forehead and another thing in a second metaphorical place; nor is it to do one thing with one's brow-muscles and another thing with some non-bodily organ. In particular, it is not to bring about a frown on one's forehead by first bringing about a frown-causing exertion of some occult non-muscle. 'He frowned intentionally' does not report the occurrence of two episodes. It reports the occurrence of one episode, but one of a very different character from that reported by 'he frowned involuntarily', though the frowns might be photographically as similar as you please.

--Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 1949

Two points -- 

1) To theists: purpose is possible without God. We are each capable of setting our own. Of what value would a God-set purpose be anyway? 

2) To many atheists: purpose is possible in a world of physical laws. As a matter of fact, as Ryle notes in his book, purpose would be impossible in a world without such laws (as though such an illogical world were conceivable). Imagine trying to set and achieve a purpose--playing pool, say--without fixed physical laws? You can't do it.