The Presumption of Atheism

Some years ago, the late philosopher and atheist Antony Flew wrote a paper titled "The Presumption of Atheism," which argued for the proposition clearly stated in the title. His point, of course, is that in considering the God question, the burden of proof ought to be on the theist, that is, the one who maintains the proof of the proposition, just as in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the state prosecutor.

This certainly makes sense. For one thing, all children start life as negative atheists: they lack a belief in God. They can't be said to believe in God until they are able to be convinced (in some way and to some extent) that God exists. At that point they may be regarded as believing that God exists on the same evidentiary basis that they believe, say, that Santa Claus exists: their parents, the most trusted source they know, told them so. For a child, whose knowledge is necessarily meager, this is not irrational. Knowledge is contextual; you can be justified in thinking something is true when in fact it is not. The child has not yet had time to widen his context.

So the presumption of atheism seems reasonable. But, then again, I wonder if that's always the case. In considering any question, each of us has to start where we are; we all have a worldview, an inherited web of interconnected beliefs, from which we will view questions and propositions. This is not a concession to relativism. Through honest inquiry and discourse, any of us is capable of revising his or her belief system to bring into better accord with reality. Socrates spent his life prompting people to do this through the method that bears his name. (Hence, my suspicion that agoraphobia was originally the rational fear of being accosted in the marketplace by a grumpy, insistent old philosopher.)

What I'm getting at is this: if someone has grown up in a religion such that it is integral to his identity and worldview, he may reasonably ask for evidence whenever someone suggests (even implicitly) or demands that he drop his belief in God and become an atheist. "Why should I?" he likely will think -- and not unreasonably. "Since we inevitably start anyway with all the beliefs we have," Roderick T. Long writes, "the burden of proof lies with those who would have us start somewhere else--and I cannot see that this burden has ever been discharged." (Reason and Value: Aristotle versus Rand)

Note that Long invokes the burden of proof here. The burden of proof is like a wet bar of soap. It easily slips from hand to hand.

To the atheist's question, is it sufficient for the atheist to reply: "Because you should have evidence for your beliefs; therefore, you should abandon your belief in God until you can support it"?

That may sound reasonable, but is it? For one thing, theists think they have evidence. (Atheists think it is poor evidence.) 

Moreover, if theists should start over with respect to their fundamental religious beliefs, shouldn't we all abandon some of our deepest beliefs and start over? I've never heard an atheist make that declaration. 

We all -- atheists included -- hold "second-hand beliefs," that is, affirmations of the truth of propositions we cannot personally verify. We all know, for example, that water is H20, but how do we know? I am confident in saying I know it, but I also know that I don't know how to prove it. So should I abandon my belief -- or at least withhold judgment -- that water is H20 until I can verify it for myself? Must I next abandon my seemingly reasonable belief that the earth is round? That the earth is older than I am? That other people aren't really robots? Maybe I should question my entire life story? When Charles Mason represented himself at trial, he objected to a witness telling the court his name on grounds of hearsay. (Objection overruled.)

Once I start down that road, how will I have time to do anything else? 

Luckily we don't have to do that. As noted, we wouldn't have the time, but it would also push us toward radical, or universal, skepticism. So what's wrong with that? Well, beside the logical contradiction involved ("I know that we cannot know"), skepticism is implausible because we get along far too well in the natural world to think that knowledge is off limits to us. And to get along, we need more than personal percept-based knowledge, which is too meager. We need what Aristotle called the "reputable beliefs" of others. Long writes, "We generally accept what theoretical physicists tell us about the nature of the universe, not because what they have to say seems particularly plausible to us, but because it seems so to them, and we respect their judgment." 

In general, I see nothing wrong with holding onto a belief that seems to fit with our knowledge and other beliefs. We hold many beliefs, and our time is limited -- so we usually won't see the need to reconsider any given belief unless some compelling reason -- say, a clash with some other seemingly well-grounded belief -- arises. Wheels that don't squeak get no grease.

In other words, a theist may reasonably ask for a reason to reconsider his theism, and atheists shouldn't be impatient with that person. But ... to be considered reasonable, that person ought to regard his beliefs as defeasible, that is, open in principle to refutation. Most theists don't hold that position about their religious beliefs.

The presumption of atheism seems to suggest that there is only one starting point in the acquisition of knowledge. But I don't think that's true. After all, kids learn a whole lot of stuff long before they learn the laws of logic or learn about the reliability of their senses -- and it couldn't happen any other way! It's a fallacy to think that because we cannot acquire knowledge without a cognitive process, we can't know anything until we understand how that process works. Think about that for a second. (I owe this point to Roderick Long.)

What matters is not where one starts but the cognitive procedure one follows and where one ends up.