The Logical Atheist

We know, with the same certainty with which we believe any  mathematical proposition, how the letters A and B are pronounced, what the colour of human blood is called, that other human beings have blood and call it "blood". That is to say, the questions  that we raise and our doubts  depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those things turn. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn the hinges must stay put. My life  consists in being content to accept many things. --Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty  340-44       

Objective certainty is not tied exclusively to conclusive reasons or self-evidence. It may be grounded in the absence of intelligible doubts .... Grounds for doubt are not as easy to come by as skeptics think. Fairy-tale imaginings (e.g. brains-in-vats) don't count. --Michael Williams, Lecture, "Wittgenstein on Knowledge & Certainty"  (video)

One cannot make experiments if there are not some things that one does not doubt. But that does not mean that one takes certain presuppositions on trust. When I write a letter and post it, I take it for granted that it will arrive--I expect this. If I make an experiment I do not doubt the existence of the apparatus before my eyes. I have plenty of doubt, but not  that . If I do a calculation I believe, without any doubts, that the figures on the paper aren't switching of their own accord, and I also trust my memory the whole time, and trust it without any reservation. The certainty here is the same as that of my never having been on the moon. --Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty  337

If, as the skeptical atheists hold, skepticism is the insistence that evidence should precede belief (that's actually evidentialism, but we'll let that go), then what are we to say about the person who declares: "I doubt that doubt is justified in such and such a case." Show me some evidence"? Is that a person a meta-skeptic?

Who has the burden of proof? Those who proffer of an affirmative proposition, of course. It seems so straightforward. But is it? Maybe not. In fact, the burden is abundant, so there's plenty to go around. We need not be stingy with it. When atheists insists that theists justify their belief in God, they are implicitly asserting the affirmative propositions that theists (like everyone else) ought to hold only justified beliefs and that since belief in God is unjustified, theists ought to abandon their belief. Those are affirmative assertions. Why should one hold only justified beliefs, and why is belief in God unjustified? I can't see why atheists have no burden of proof here. If theists state their evidence (reason) for believing, the atheists may well say that the purported evidence is unconvincing. But why don't atheists bear a burden of proof here? They've put forth an affirmative position. One tricky thing about the burden of proof is that many negative statements,...

Here's a thought experiment I got from George Mason University Professor Bryan Caplan, who wrote about this long before he became a professional economist: Make any assumptions you want, however unrealistic, to produce a scenario in which a team of neuroscientists can predict that ten minutes from now you will raise your right arm. Assume also that the team informs you of the prediction.  Question: will you or will you not be able to falsify the prediction? Further questions: does the fact that the team informed you of the prediction make a difference? If so, how? Could the team adjust for the fact that you know the prediction? How? The only plausible conclusion is that you can indeed falsify the prediction if you want to  because what could possibly stop you? But if that's the case, the neuroscientists were wrong: your actions are not determined. And if you are free when informed, why aren't you free when you're not informed? I hope no will suggest the prediction cause...

If science--uncontroversially--starts with, seeks to explain, and builds on observation, George Mason University economist Bryan Caplan asks , why would anyone who is pro-science deny one of our most basic, inescapable, and continuing observations: our freedom to choose among the alternatives that we encounter every day? If something is fundamentally wrong with introspection, let's hear what it is. Moreover, if something is fundamentally wrong with introspection, then something must also be fundamentally wrong with extro spection, i.e., perception. Where's the evidence for that and how was it acquired?  If you reply that together we can compare our individual extrospections, I will counter that we can also compare our individual introspections. In both cases it's called conversation. And by the way, any honest person you ask will tell you they make decisions freely all the time. It takes a philosopher or a neuroscientist to confuse the issue.